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THE INCLUSIVENESS OF THE
NEW ORIGINALISM
James E. Fleming*
I. THE ARC OF ORIGINALISM FROM 1996 TO THE PRESENT
This Symposium on The New Originalism in Constitutional Law is an
excellent sequel to the 1996 Fordham Law Review Symposium on Fidelity
in Constitutional Theory.1 I was privileged to be a co-organizer of that
conference—together with Abner Greene as well as Martin Flaherty, Robert
Kaczorowski, and William Treanor—as Dean Michael Martin and
Associate Dean Benjamin Zipursky have graciously recalled in their
opening remarks. I also wrote an article for it.2
I want to begin by acknowledging how much the landscape of
constitutional theory has changed since the Fordham Symposium on
Fidelity. In 1996, it was common for originalists such as Robert Bork and
Antonin Scalia to assert a monopoly on concern for fidelity in constitutional
interpretation, claiming that fidelity requires following the rules laid down
by, or giving effect to the relatively specific original understanding or
meaning of, the Framers and ratifiers of the Constitution.3 Bork and Scalia
said that the originalists are the ones who care about fidelity in
constitutional interpretation, and all those other folks—the “revisionists”
and “nonoriginalists”—don’t.4
The Fordham Symposium on Fidelity implicitly challenged this narrow
originalist claim to a monopoly on fidelity, for it featured several competing
conceptions of fidelity that were decidedly not conventional originalist
conceptions: (1) Ronald Dworkin’s understanding of fidelity as pursuing
* Professor of Law, The Honorable Frank R. Kenison Distinguished Scholar in Law, and
Associate Dean for Research and Intellectual Life, Boston University School of Law.
Congratulations to Ben Zipursky, along with Abner Greene and Saul Cornell, for organizing
such a splendid Symposium. Thanks to Sot Barber, Abner Greene, and Ben Zipursky for
helpful discussions concerning my arguments in the Article. Thanks also to my research
assistants, Kate Lebeaux and Chris Mercurio. The Article is part of a book in progress,
tentatively entitled Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, and accordingly I have drawn
upon prior work that is a part of that project.
1. Symposium, Fidelity in Constitutional Theory, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1247 (1997).
2. James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV.
1335 (1997).
3. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW 143 (1990); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849,
854, 862–63 (1989).
4. BORK, supra note 3, at 187–240; ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 37–47 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); Scalia, supra note 3, at
852–56, 862–64.
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integrity with the moral reading of the Constitution;5 (2) Bruce Ackerman’s
understanding of fidelity as synthesis of constitutional moments;6 (3)
Lawrence Lessig’s understanding of fidelity as translation across
generations;7 (4) Jack Rakove’s understanding of fidelity as keeping faith
with the Founders’ vision;8 and (5) an early formulation of Jack Balkin’s
conception that ultimately became his method of text and principle with its
argument for fidelity to abstract original public meaning.9
Most pointedly, Dworkin sought to turn the tables on the narrow
originalists like Bork and Scalia: he argued that commitment to fidelity—
understood as pursuing integrity with the moral reading of the
Constitution—entails the very approach that they are at pains to insist it
forbids and prohibits the very approach that they imperiously maintain it
mandates. Ackerman, Lessig, and Balkin have taken a different tack,
attempting to beat narrow originalists at their own game: they have
advanced fidelity as synthesis, fidelity as translation, and the method of text
and principle as broad or abstract or “living” forms of originalism that are
superior, as conceptions of originalism, to narrow originalism.
By 1996, originalists had begun to talk about “original understanding” or
“original meaning” as distinguished from “intention of the Framers.” And
some people had begun to talk about “broad” originalism (e.g., Lessig) and
“faint-hearted” originalism (e.g., Scalia).10 But the “new originalism” as
we know it today had not yet appeared on the landscape. Not long after that
5. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 73–76 (1996) [hereinafter DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW]; RONALD DWORKIN,
LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL
FREEDOM 125–29 (1993); Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism,
Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1249, 1253 (1997).
6. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 88–89, 159–62 (1991)
(developing an understanding of fidelity as questing “multigenerational synthesis” or
“interpretive synthesis” across the three constitutional regimes or moments of the Founding,
Reconstruction, and the New Deal); Bruce Ackerman, A Generation of Betrayal?, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 1519, 1519–20 (1997) (advancing his conception of fidelity as pursuing
intergenerational synthesis).
7. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1365, 1367–68,
1371–76 (1997) (arguing for an understanding of fidelity as “grounded in a practice of
translation”); see also Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165,
1263–64 (1993) (arguing for a conception of fidelity as translation).
8. See Jack N. Rakove, Fidelity Through History (or to It), 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1587,
1605–09 (1997) (discussing “fidelity to history” and its superiority to originalism, which is a
kind of “fidelity through history”); see also JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS:
POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 3–22 (1996) (discussing the
“perils” of conventional originalism).
9. See J.M. Balkin, Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 1703, 1708–09 (1997) (distinguishing between fidelity to the “true
Constitution or the best interpretation of the Constitution [and] its various historical
interpretations and manifestations”). Balkin subsequently reworked and incorporated this
piece in JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST
WORLD 103–38 (2011), the companion book to JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 3–5
(2011) [hereinafter BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM] (arguing for fidelity to abstract text and
principle).
10. See generally Fleming, supra note 2 (discussing Lessig’s “broad” originalism and
Scalia’s narrow “faint-hearted” originalism).
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conference, the new originalism did emerge. Its earliest formulations
evidently came from Randy Barnett in An Originalism for Nonoriginalists11
and Keith Whittington shortly thereafter in The New Originalism.12
How has originalism changed since 1996? I shall distinguish several
points or phases in the “arc of originalism” from the old to the new.13
These points are analytical, and only roughly chronological. The first phase
I have called (1) the “Balkanization of originalism” (together with (2) the
“Balkinization of originalism”). That is what happens (1) when originalism
splits into warring camps and (2) when even Jack Balkin, hitherto a
pragmatic living constitutionalist, becomes an originalist.14 During this
phase, which continues today, we see that originalism is a moving target, a
work in progress, or a family of theories rather than one coherent, unified
constitutional theory.
The second phase is the development of a highly programmatic new
originalism (or new originalisms). During this phase, which is well
represented at this conference by Randy Barnett, Keith Whittington, and
Lawrence Solum, sophisticated constitutional theorists have developed
disciplined, programmatic conceptions of constitutional interpretation and
construction. These new originalists have emphasized two developments:
(1) the movement from a focus on “intention of the Framers” to “original
public meaning” and (2) the articulation of and emphasis on the distinction
between interpretation and construction.
Third, and roughly parallel to the movement from the first phase to the
second, is the movement from: (1) a dogmatic, axiomatic view assuming
that originalism simply has to be the best, or indeed the only, conception of
constitutional interpretation to (2) a view recognizing that originalists have
to make normative arguments in support of their conceptions. I have
criticized the former view as stemming from what I have called “the
originalist premise.”15 The originalist premise is the assumption that
originalism, rightly conceived, is the best, or indeed the only, conception of
fidelity in constitutional interpretation. Put more strongly, it is the
assumption that originalism, rightly conceived, has to be the best, or indeed
the only, conception of constitutional interpretation. Why so? Because
originalism, rightly conceived, just has to be. By definition. In the nature
of things—in the nature of the Constitution, in the nature of law, in the
nature of interpretation, in the nature of fidelity in constitutional
interpretation! Axiomatically.

11. Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611 (1999).
12. Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 599 (2004).
Whittington presented drafts of this paper as early as 2002.
13. The title of the panel in the Fordham Symposium on The New Originalism in
Constitutional Law for which I prepared this Article was “The Arc of Originalism.”
14. See, e.g., James E. Fleming, The Balkanization of Originalism, 67 MD. L. REV. 10
(2007); James E. Fleming, The Balkinization of Originalism, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 669
[hereinafter Fleming, Balkinization].
15. James E. Fleming, Are We All Originalists Now? I Hope Not!, 91 TEX. L. REV.
1785, 1794–97 (2013); Fleming, supra note 2, at 1344.
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Illustrating the latter view, Solum stresses normative arguments for
originalism from rule of law/determinacy, popular sovereignty/democracy,
and ruliness, while Whittington emphasizes an argument from fidelity.16 I
shall take up their arguments in Part IV. In making these normative
arguments, the new originalists have made spectacular concessions to
critics of originalism like the moral readers. (By “moral reading,” I refer to
conceptions of the Constitution as embodying abstract moral and political
principles, not codifying concrete historical rules or practices.) Indeed, they
have unwittingly shown that they are engaged in making normative
judgments that the moral readers have argued were necessary and that the
old originalists have contended were illegitimate and forbidden (in Bork’s
formulations, “subver[sive]” and “here[tical]”).17
A fourth and final point in the arc of originalism, also parallel to these
other movements, is a shift from an exclusionary outlook to an inclusionary
outlook, to be explained in Part II. As my title suggests, I am going to bring
out the inclusiveness of the new originalism and ponder its implications.18
This Article is part of a larger work, a book in progress tentatively
entitled Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution.19 To set the stage for my
arguments about the inclusiveness of the new originalism, I shall draw upon
several pieces in the story thus far. My main points are two. First, the
inclusiveness of the new originalism shows that it will require the very
judgments that proponents of the moral reading have argued are necessary
in constitutional interpretation and construction. Indeed, this inclusiveness
points toward the possibility of reconciliation between certain forms of the
new originalism and the moral reading. But second, I shall sketch a
cautionary tale about the movement within originalism from “intention of
the Framers” to “original public meaning.” For example, in Justice Scalia’s
hands, resort to original public meaning over and against the purposes of
constitutional amendment as expressed by the Framers and ratifiers in their
language and debates may blunt the very possibility of constitutional
transformation through amendment.

16. See infra Part IV.
17. BORK, supra note 3, at 136, 352.
18. I mean to intimate an analogy between inclusive new originalism and the idea within
jurisprudence of “inclusive legal positivism.” Put roughly, “inclusive legal positivism”
responds to criticisms of positivism by moral readers like Dworkin by incorporating the
moral principles and judgments Dworkin says are necessary—and which exclusive legal
positivism excludes—within positivism itself. Likewise, inclusive new originalism responds
to criticisms of originalism by moral readers like Dworkin by incorporating the moral
principles and judgments Dworkin says are necessary—and which exclusive originalism
excludes—within the new originalism itself.
19. My article for the Fordham Symposium on Fidelity bearing the same title, Fleming,
supra note 2, was my first article in what has become the book project.
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II. ARE WE ALL ORIGINALISTS NOW?
In recent years, some have asked: “Are we all originalists now?” My
response to the question is: “I hope not!”20 By contrast, Solum replies:
“We are all originalists now.”21 The answer to the question depends, as he
recognizes, on “what one means by originalism”22 and whether we define it
exclusively or inclusively.
In defining originalism, Solum distills an elegant framework with four
basic ideas. It is worth quoting in full:
1. The fixation thesis: The linguistic meaning of the constitutional text
was fixed at the time each provision was framed and ratified.
2. The public meaning thesis: Constitutional meaning is fixed by the
understanding of the words and phrases and the grammar and syntax that
characterized the linguistic practices of the public and not by the
intentions of the framers.
3. The textual constraint thesis: The original meaning of the text of the
Constitution has legal force: the text is law and not a mere symbol.
4. The interpretation-construction distinction: Constitutional practice
includes two distinct activities: (1) constitutional interpretation, which
discerns the linguistic meaning of the text, and (2) constitutional
construction, which determines the legal effect of the text.23

Solum aspires to understand originalism (and, for that matter, living
constitutionalism) “in their best light—in their most sophisticated and
defensible versions.”24
If we define originalism inclusively enough, we might say that we
evidently are all originalists now. Indeed, we might just define originalism
so broadly that even I would no longer hope that we are not all originalists
now! Applying Solum’s framework, we would conclude that Balkin, with
his self-described living originalist method of text and principle, definitely
is an originalist.25 Dworkin, with his moral reading of the Constitution,
surely also is.26 Sotirios A. Barber and I, with our philosophic approach to
constitutional interpretation (and my own “Constitution-perfecting theory”),
are as well.27 So, too, are reasonable, bounded, and grounded versions of

20. Fleming, supra note 15. In this section, I draw upon my arguments in the cited
article.
21. ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A
DEBATE 3 (2011). All citations to the foregoing source refer only to Lawrence Solum’s
contributions to the book. In this section and the next, I draw from my review of the book,
James E. Fleming, The New Originalist Manifesto, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 539 (2013) (book
review).
22. BENNETT & SOLUM, supra note 21, at 61 (emphasis omitted).
23. Id. at 4.
24. Id. at 5.
25. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 9.
26. DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 5.
27. SOTIRIOS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: THE
BASIC QUESTIONS (2007); JAMES E. FLEMING, SECURING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: THE
CASE OF AUTONOMY 16, 210–11 (2006).
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living constitutionalism. All of these theories evidently can accept the four
theses quoted above. Under Solum’s formulation, originalism clearly is a
big tent—charitable, magnanimous, and inclusionary—rather than the
dogmatic, scolding, and exclusionary outlook that we see in originalist
works like Bork’s The Tempting of America and Scalia’s A Matter of
Interpretation.28
But if we define originalism so inclusively—and we are all now in this
big tent—it may not be very useful to say that we are all originalists now.
We may obscure our differences more than we elucidate common ground.
We would persist in most of our theoretical disagreements—it is just that
we would say that the disagreements are among varieties of so-called
originalism. And the debates concerning interpretation and construction,
thus recast or translated, would go on much as before.
Clearly, affirmative answers to the question, “are we all originalists
now?” stem from inclusive conceptions of what comes within originalism
and, in particular, the new originalism or new originalisms. For we most
definitely are not all old originalists now! In bringing out the inclusiveness
of the new originalism, I shall focus on Solum’s emphasis on the distinction
between interpretation and construction, in particular, his acknowledgment
of the large role that construction (which on his account is not originalist)
plays in our constitutional practice.
III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN INTERPRETATION
AND CONSTRUCTION
Let’s be clear about what Solum claims regarding the significance of the
distinction between interpretation and construction. In explaining this
distinction, he invokes H.L.A. Hart’s well-known formulation concerning
the core and penumbra. He presents the core as a zone for interpretation and
the penumbra as a zone for construction.29 He contends that hard cases, by
definition, are underdetermined by interpretation of original public meaning
and so require construction.30
Furthermore, Solum says that originalism is a theory of interpretation,
not a theory of construction. In developing the interpretation-construction
distinction, Solum plainly states, “Originalism itself does not have a theory
of constitutional construction.”31 He also states, “Whereof originalism
cannot speak, thereof it must be silent.”32 Even though construction in hard
cases lies beyond interpretation (and thus beyond originalism), he claims
that new originalists insist that original public meaning should constrain
construction.33

28. BORK, supra note 3; SCALIA, supra note 4.
29. BENNETT & SOLUM, supra note 21, at 22 (discussing H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAW 121–32 (1961)).
30. Id. at 22–23.
31. Id. at 60.
32. Id. at 26.
33. Id.
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I shall make two general observations that demonstrate how inclusive
Solum’s new originalism is. First, Solum concedes that much that is
important in constitutional law goes on in the construction zone in deciding
hard cases and developing constitutional doctrine. We might doubt how
many important constitutional questions are resolved through interpretation
of original public meaning. I suspect that Solum would find greater
agreement with his analysis of interpretation and construction among living
constitutionalists and moral readers than among most conventional
originalists. For living constitutionalists and moral readers would agree that
hard cases lie in the construction zone and that interpretation of original
public meaning does not determine the outcomes in these disputes. But old
originalists and many other contemporary originalists would reject these
claims as capitulations. Some, like the old originalists, would insist that
interpretation is determinative both in deciding hard cases and developing
constitutional doctrine.34 Others would deny the necessity or the legitimacy
of construction. And some who accept the legitimacy of construction
would go along with Whittington in adopting what Solum calls the model
of construction as politics: they would say that interpretation is for courts
and construction is for legislatures and executives.35
Second, what Solum says about how construction should proceed—how
he proposes to build out doctrine and decide hard cases in the construction
zone—is compatible with a moral reading. In defending this view, I shall
focus on two things he says about originalism in relation to construction.
One, Solum states that “originalists can and should agree that constitutional
construction (as currently practiced) involves a plurality of methods—
purposes, structure, precedent, and all the rest.”36 He rejects the common
living constitutionalist argument that the very existence of “multiple
modalities” shows the impossibility of originalism. He contends instead
that “these methods are properly brought to bear on the task of
constitutional construction.”37 Thus, he practically makes peace with living
constitutionalism concerning the multiple modalities of argument in the
construction zone. Whittington recently has taken a similar approach in
recognizing what he calls “pluralism within originalism” or how originalist
arguments exist in an environment of “pluralism in constitutional
interpretation”38 (or, Solum would insist, construction).
Two, Solum mentions three available models of construction as eligible
within the new originalism:

34. Id. at 20–22.
35. Id. at 69–70.
36. Id. at 60.
37. Id. at 59–60 (referring to the well-known view concerning multiple modalities as
developed in PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION
(1982)).
38. See Keith E. Whittington, On Pluralism Within Originalism, in THE CHALLENGE OF
ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 70, 76 (Grant Huscroft &
Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011).
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1. Construction as politics (associated with Whittington): “when judges
leave the realm of constitutional interpretation and enter the construction
zone, they defer to the decisions made by political processes.”
2. Construction as principle (associated with Balkin):
“[i]n the
construction zone, judges should aim to create constitutional doctrines
that comport with political ideals for which the general, abstract, and
vague provisions of the Constitution aim.”
3. Construction by original methods (inspired by the work of John
McGinnis and Michael Rappaport but not their own view): “when
modern courts engage in constitutional construction, they should employ”
the original methods in use when the Constitution was adopted.39

Solum does not exactly say which model of construction is the most
promising for the new originalism that he himself proposes. But there are
significant differences between Whittington’s model of construction as
politics and Solum’s approach to construction. For Whittington, at least in
his initial formulation, interpretation is for judges and construction is for
legislatures and executives.40 For Solum, by contrast, construction is also
for judges in developing constitutional doctrine where interpretation is
underdeterminative.41 Furthermore, it does not appear that Solum himself
would emphasize construction by original methods. Finally, there is good
reason to believe that Solum thinks that Balkin’s model of construction as
principle is the most promising approach for the new originalism that he
himself advocates. What is more, Balkin’s is the most promising model for
a reconciliation of originalism and living constitutionalism; indeed, Balkin
calls his new originalism “living originalism.”42
There is also considerable hope for reconciliation between new
originalism and moral readings regarding construction. First, moral readers
like Barber and I deploy a fusion of approaches in what Solum calls “the
construction zone.” “Within such a fusion, we . . . understand text,
consensus, intentions, structures, and doctrines not as alternatives to but as
sites of philosophic reflection and choice about the best understanding of
our constitutional commitments.”43 Second, moral readers should embrace
Balkin’s model of construction as the method of text and principle. In fact,
I have argued that Balkin’s theory is a moral reading of the Constitution.44
For Balkin conceives the Constitution as embodying not only rules but also
general standards and abstract principles. He recognizes that in interpreting
these general standards and abstract principles, we have to make moral and
political judgments concerning the best understanding of our commitments;
history alone does not make those judgments for us in rule-like fashion.45
Moreover, there are unmistakable affinities between Balkin’s commitment
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

BENNETT & SOLUM, supra note 21, at 69–70.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.
BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 9.
BARBER & FLEMING, supra note 27, at 190.
Fleming, Balkinization, supra note 14, at 675–79.
BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 9, at 23–34.
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to interpret and construct the Constitution so as to redeem our faith in its
promises and aspirations, and a moral reading’s commitment to interpret
and construct the Constitution so as to make it the best it can be.46
Thus, if Solum’s new originalism embraces Balkin’s method of text and
principle—as an approach to interpretation and construction—it has much
in common with a moral reading.
IV. THE NORMATIVE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE NEW ORIGINALISM
Unlike many originalists, who practically assume that originalism—by
definition or axiomatically—is the only legitimate approach to
constitutional interpretation,47 Solum acknowledges the need to make
normative arguments for originalism. He stresses the arguments that
originalism is more compatible with the rule of law and popular sovereignty
and is more ruly than competing theories.48 But Solum’s generous and
inclusive formulation of the new originalism undercuts all of these
arguments concerning the supposed virtues of originalism over the moral
reading.
In making such normative arguments for originalism, the new originalists
trade on certain features of familiar pictures of originalism without
acknowledging that they have redrawn those pictures so as to blur or
obliterate those features—without acknowledging the concessions that they
have made to living constitutionalists’ and moral readers’ criticisms. Once
we bring the concessions to light—as aspects of the inclusiveness of the
new originalism—we see that the new originalists forfeit their claims to
these supposed virtues of originalism over the moral reading. And, once
the new originalists make these arguments—with their concessions to moral
readers—we see that they are no longer simply engaged in a quest for the
original public meaning of the Constitution while avoiding normative
judgments of the sort called for by the moral reading. Instead, we see that
they implicitly have conceded the need to make the very normative
judgments that moral readers have insisted upon and that the old originalists
have been at pains to avoid.
First, consider the rule-of-law/determinacy argument. The general claim
is that originalism promises more determinacy in constitutional
interpretation than does the moral reading and, as such, is more consistent
with the rule of law. After all, originalism, even the new originalism, seeks
to discover and enforce the original public meaning of the Constitution. By
contrast, the moral reading requires complex and controversial normative
judgments about the best understanding of abstract constitutional
commitments.

46. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 255 (1986).
47. For criticism of originalists who evidently take it as axiomatically given, see
BARBER & FLEMING, supra note 27, at 104–07; Fleming, supra note 15, at 1794–96;
Fleming, supra note 2, at 1344.
48. BENNETT & SOLUM, supra note 21, at 36–44.
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Yet Solum’s concessions that interpretation underdetermines outcomes,
and that the development of doctrine occurs in the construction zone,
undermines his rule of law argument that only originalism “guarantees a
stable core of fixed constitutional meaning.”49 Indeed, on his account, the
development of doctrine takes place in the construction zone, and
originalism does not provide a theory of construction. Moreover, Solum
concedes that some constitutional commitments are relatively abstract
principles and standards, for example, equal protection, liberty, cruel and
unusual punishment, freedom of speech, and the like. Interpretation (much
less construction) of these abstract principles and standards, however, will
not be a matter of doing historical research to unearth determinate, concrete
original public meanings (much less concrete original expected applications
of the Framers and ratifiers). It will not be bounded and determinate in the
way that the argument from rule of law/determinacy presupposes. Nor,
indeed, will construction be bounded in this way. Rather, interpretation and
construction of relatively abstract principles and standards are going to
require normative judgments about the best understanding of those
principles and standards. These are the very judgments which moral
readers have insisted are central to constitutional interpretation and
construction and which old originalists have sought in vain to banish.
Second, consider the argument from popular sovereignty/democracy.
The general claim is that originalism is more democratic than the moral
reading because originalism invalidates actions embodying current majority
will (as enacted in the ordinary law of legislation) in the name of preserving
the will of We the People (as embodied in the higher law of the
Constitution) against encroachment. Whereas (so the originalists say) the
moral reading does so in the name of the moral judgments of unelected
justices of the Supreme Court. As such, the argument goes, originalism is
ultimately more democratic. Indeed, it is consistent with and reinforces
popular sovereignty.
Yet Solum’s ideas about how we develop doctrine in the construction
zone undermines his popular sovereignty argument for originalism. For it
turns out that We the People when ratifying the Constitution in 1791, or
ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, did not adopt determinative
answers to our questions. And so, in constructing doctrine, the new
originalists are not simply following the rules laid down by We the People.
Thus, even on Solum’s account, the decisions made by the popular
sovereign in the past are underdeterminative; to that degree, the argument
for originalism from popular sovereignty is attenuated. The method of
construction as principle is not going to involve resolution of hard cases
through historical research concerning relatively concrete and determinate
original public meaning. It is going to require making normative judgments
about the best understanding of our constitutional commitments to
relatively abstract principles and standards. Again, these are the very

49. Id. at 41.
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judgments that moral readers have insisted are necessary and that old
originalists have asserted were illegitimate if not subversive and heretical.
Third, consider the ruliness argument for originalism. The ruliness claim
is that originalism is more rule-like and thus more ruly than living
constitutionalism and moral readings. For originalism claims, again, that
constitutional interpretation is a matter of determining the historical original
public meaning of relatively concrete commitments. This is as it should be
under an understanding of the rule of law as a law of rules.50 Constitutional
interpretation is not—the ruliness argument claims—a matter of making
controversial normative judgments about the best understanding of abstract
commitments. It is not a matter of making all-things-considered “reasoned
judgments” about what our commitments and traditions, understood as
“living thing[s],” have come to when understood in their best light.51 Nor is
constitutional interpretation a matter of making complex normative and
pragmatic judgments after deploying “multiple modalities” of constitutional
argument.52 These types of argument and judgment—the heart of
interpretation and construction for living constitutionalists and moral
readers—have been anathema to originalists like Scalia and Bork because
they seem to be unruly and to require complex normative or pragmatic
judgments.
Yet, new originalists like Solum, in response to living constitutionalist
arguments that “multiple modalities” of argument in our constitutional
practice refute originalism, now say that originalists can accept that
construction embraces these multiple modalities of argument.53 Likewise,
new originalists like Whittington now say that (evidently hitherto monistic)
originalists can recognize and accept what he calls “pluralism within
originalism” or how originalist arguments exist in an environment of
“pluralism in constitutional interpretation”54 (or, Solum would insist,
construction).
But in making these concessions the new originalists forfeit the ruliness
argument for originalism over the moral reading. Not just because they let
in the “multiple modalities” in the first place; but also because they cannot
plausibly claim that judges and scholars who work through and assess the
multiple modalities of argument are seeking to discover and enforce the
original public meaning of the Constitution. Instead, they quite plainly are
making normative or pragmatic judgments about the best understanding of
our constitutional commitments and practice. Again, these are the very
50. I am alluding to Justice Scalia’s famous article, The Rule of Law As a Law of Rules.
See generally Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law As a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175
(1989).
51. I am alluding to the joint opinion of Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter in
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848–49 (1992),
embracing Justice Harlan’s approach to constitutional interpretation in Poe v. Ullman, 367
U.S. 497, 543, 549 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
52. I am alluding to Bobbitt’s well-known view as developed in his book. See supra note
37.
53. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
54. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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judgments that the moral readers have insisted were necessary, and that the
old originalists have disparaged as illegitimate.
Fourth and finally, consider the argument for originalism from fidelity.
In The New Originalism, Whittington argues, “The primary virtue claimed
by the new originalism is one of constitutional fidelity, not of judicial
restraint or democratic majoritarianism.”55 He contends that the new
originalism “does not require judges to get out of the way of legislatures. It
requires judges to uphold the original Constitution—nothing more, but also
nothing less.”56 Whittington’s argument from fidelity brings us back to the
topic of the 1996 Fordham Symposium.
As I observed above, many originalists have claimed a monopoly on
concern for fidelity in constitutional interpretation, yet many leading
constitutional scholars in that Symposium advanced conceptions of fidelity
that are not conventional originalist conceptions. In my paper for the
Symposium, I argued that the aspiration to fidelity
raises two fundamental questions: Fidelity to what? and What is fidelity?
The short answer to the first—fidelity to the Constitution—poses a further
question: What is the Constitution? For example, does the Fourteenth
Amendment embody abstract moral principles or enact relatively concrete
historical rules? . . . The short answer to the second—being faithful to the
Constitution in interpreting it—leads to another question: How should the
Constitution be interpreted?
Does faithfulness to the Fourteenth
Amendment require recourse to political theory to elaborate general moral
concepts or prohibit it and instead require historical research to discover
relatively specific original understanding? And does the quest for fidelity
in interpreting the Constitution exhort us to make it the best it can be or
forbid us to do so in favor of enforcing an imperfect Constitution?57

The old originalists answered the first question—Fidelity to what?—by
saying, why of course fidelity to the intention of the Framers or the concrete
original expected applications of the Framers and ratifiers. Yet the new
originalists, somewhat like the moral readers, answer it by saying, fidelity
to the original public meaning, which includes that of some relatively
abstract principles and standards. The old originalists answered the second
question—What is fidelity?—with their authoritarian understanding that
fidelity commands us to follow the authority of the past: following our
historical practices and the concrete original expected applications of the
Framers and ratifiers. The moral readers, by contrast, answer it with their
understanding that fidelity exhorts us to honor our abstract aspirational
principles (or to redeem the promise of our abstract commitments). Fidelity
is living up to and realizing the aspirations embodied in our experiment in
self-governance under a scheme of principles.
The new originalists, with their new arguments and new conceptions,
cannot simply adhere to the old originalist conception of fidelity. In other

55. Whittington, supra note 12, at 609.
56. Id.
57. Fleming, supra note 2, at 1335.
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work, I have argued—and in my book in progress I shall further argue—
that the moral reading offers a better understanding of fidelity than does any
variety of originalism, old or new.58 I shall not repeat those arguments
here. The point that is relevant here is that once the new originalists make
the reasonable and inclusive concessions that they have made—that
constitutional adjudication: (1) includes interpretation and construction of
relatively abstract principles and standards, not merely interpretation of
determinate, concrete rules or terms of art; (2) involves interpretation and
construction through multiple modalities of argument, not simply
interpretation through historical research concerning concrete original
expected applications; and (3) requires construction that is not originalist
and that involves making normative judgments about how to redeem the
Constitution’s abstract commitments—they have forfeited their arguments
that originalism is superior on the ground of fidelity to the moral reading.
For they have implicitly accepted the moral reading’s conception of fidelity
as requiring complex normative judgments in order to realize our
constitutional commitments and aspirations, or to interpret and construct the
Constitution so as to make it the best it can be. And they have implicitly
rejected the old originalist conception of fidelity as simply following the
commands of the Framers and ratifiers, or following the authority of the
past.
To recapitulate: the inclusiveness of the new originalism—in particular,
the arguments regarding construction—undermines the new originalists’
normative arguments for originalism over the moral reading, indeed forfeits
the new originalism’s supposed comparative virtues. What is the upshot of
my argument? Should the new originalists like Solum not have made these
reasonable, inclusive concessions to the moral reading that conventional
originalists have resisted?
Should they have remained doggedly
exclusionary, dogmatically insisting on their superior claim to these virtues
and rejecting construction as illegitimate?
Most certainly not. My point is not that the new originalists have gone
wrong in being inclusive. Quite the opposite. It is rather that the new
originalists, having made these concessions, should now also acknowledge
that they are engaged in a moral reading of the Constitution. To Solum’s
question, “Are we all originalists now?” I not only answer “I hope not,” but
also aim to show the extent to which we are all moral readers now.59 I shall
pursue these matters further in my book. There I shall urge the new
originalists to come within the big tent of the moral reading.
So far, I have focused on the first of Solum’s claims about what is
distinctive about the new originalism: the significance of the distinction
between interpretation and construction. Now, I shall turn to the second of
his claims: the significance of the movement from “intention of the
58. See id. at 1338, 1353–55; see also Fleming, supra note 15, at 1798–99, 1806; James
E. Fleming, Fit, Justification, and Fidelity in Constitutional Interpretation, 93 B.U. L. REV.
1281, 1288–90 (2013).
59. Fleming, supra note 15, at 1786, 1805–06; Fleming, Balkinization, supra note 14, at
669–71.
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Framers” to “original public meaning.” To this point, I have characterized
this development optimistically, pointing out that to the extent the new
originalists acknowledge that we might conceive original public meaning
abstractly, the new originalism might be inclusive and bear affinities to the
moral reading. In the final section of this Article, I shall acknowledge that
this move to original public meaning is not necessarily more hospitable to
the moral reading. We can see this clearly in the constitutional
jurisprudence of Justice Scalia.
V. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MOVEMENT FROM INTENTION OF THE
FRAMERS TO ORIGINAL PUBLIC MEANING
In some instances, I believe that the move within originalism from
intention of the Framers to original public meaning is largely a public
relations move—one that seems to acknowledge the flaws in the old
originalism, yet to leave the actual practice of originalism unaffected. That
is, originalists officially state that their quest is for the original public
meaning. But they persist in dredging up what they see as concrete original
expected applications of the Framers and ratifiers or they rewrite evidently
abstract commitments like “privileges or immunities” or “freedom of
speech” into determinate, lawyerly terms of art (commitments concerning
which, ironically, there is no original public meaning, only technical
lawyerly meanings beyond the ken of the public). Balkin has demonstrated
this point effectively.60
In other instances, however, the move to original public meaning does
affect the practice of originalism. For example, in Justice Scalia’s
jurisprudence, it moves originalism in a conservative direction. Here I
mean “conservative” not simply in a substantive political sense of
supporting the outcomes conservatives favor, but also in a Burkean sense of
conceiving original public meaning as being the deposit of historical
practices rather than abstract normative commitments that might be critical
of, or at any rate different from, those practices. We see this clearly in
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in the Virginia Military Institute (VMI)
case, United States v. Virginia,61 and his opinion of the Court in the right to
bear arms case, District of Columbia v. Heller.62
On Justice Scalia’s view, the original public meaning of the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment is not
the ordinary moral understandings of citizens in 1868 concerning their
normative commitments to abstract and contested principles like equality
and liberty. Rather, it is the deposit of historical practices embodied in the
statute books and common law as of 1868. Scalia famously articulates this
conception in his dissent in Virginia (in the context of equal protection) and

60. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 9, at 100–01, 103–05; Fleming,
Balkinization, supra note 14, at 674–75.
61. 518 U.S. 515, 566 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
62. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
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in his plurality opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D.63 (in the setting of due
process).
According to Scalia, the point of constitutional commitments is to
embody historical practices so conceived. And so, for example, the original
public meaning of the Equal Protection Clause is not that of an abstract,
normative principle that condemns class legislation or the maintenance of a
caste system that reduces or maintains certain classes of people in the status
of an inferior caste beneath full citizenship—whether on the basis of race,
sex, or sexual orientation. Instead, for Scalia, the Equal Protection Clause
embodies a deposit of historical practices: if single-sex educational
institutions like VMI were not viewed as an unconstitutional practice in
1868, and there has been a historical practice of maintaining such single-sex
educational institutions ever since, then the operation of VMI as a singlesex military college simply does not violate the Constitution.
To elaborate, in dissent in Virginia, Scalia objects that “[the Court]
counts for nothing the long tradition, enduring down to the present, of
men’s military colleges supported by both States and the Federal
Government.”64 Let’s contrast Scalia’s view with Justice Ginsberg’s view
in the opinion of the Court concerning history and tradition in interpreting
the Equal Protection Clause. Let’s distinguish between two competing
conceptions of tradition: historical practices (equal protection includes
whatever was protected specifically in the statute books or recognized
concretely in the common law when the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted in 1868) versus aspirational principles (equal protection embodies
principles to which we as a people aspire, and for which we as a people
stand, whether or not we have always or yet realized them in our historical
practices, statute books, or common law).65 Which conception does Scalia
embrace? Clearly the former, historical practices. Which conception does
Ginsburg embrace? Clearly the latter, aspirational principles that are
critical of our longstanding historical practices. Furthermore, let’s contrast
Ginsburg’s and Scalia’s attitudes toward the longstanding historical practice
of excluding women from VMI. Ginsburg views this as longstanding sex
discrimination in violation of the Constitution, which aspires to “full
citizenship stature” for women as well as men.66 By contrast, Scalia writes
that “longstanding national traditions [are] the primary determinant of what
the Constitution means.”67 Indeed, he argues that the Court’s interpretation
of the Equal Protection Clause “cannot supersede—and indeed ought to be
crafted so as to reflect—those constant and unbroken national traditions
that embody the people’s understanding” of the Equal Protection Clause.68
In short, the fact that we have a longstanding historical practice of
excluding women from VMI is practically conclusive evidence that the
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

491 U.S. 110 (1989).
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 566 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
For elaboration of this distinction, see FLEMING, supra note 27, at 112–16.
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532.
Id. at 570 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 568.
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exclusion of women from VMI does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause.
For moral readers such as Justice Brennan, Justice Ginsburg, or Justice
Stevens, the point of adopting and amending the Constitution is not to
embody longstanding historical practices, but to transform them in pursuit
of our constitutional aspirations to normative principles like equality and
liberty. Brennan wrote, “Interpretation must account for the transformative
purpose of the text. Our Constitution was not intended to preserve a
preexisting society but to make a new one, to put in place new principles
that the prior political community had not sufficiently recognized.” He
continued, “Thus, for example, when we interpret the Civil War
amendments . . . we must remember that those who put them in place had
no desire to enshrine the status quo. Their goal was to make over their
world.”69 That is Brennan’s conception of the abstract, aspirational original
public meaning of the Civil War Amendments, including the Fourteenth
Amendment. For Brennan, Ginsburg, and Stevens, the Fourteenth
Amendment commits us to equal protection on our best understanding, not
equality as it was reflected in the common law and statute books in 1868,
with all manner of racist, sexist, and heterosexist expectations and
presuppositions.70 It also commits us to liberty on our best understanding,
not liberty as it was manifested in the common law and statute books as of
1868.71 As they see it, originalists seeking to enforce Scalia-like
conceptions of original public meaning eviscerate the Fourteenth
Amendment’s transformative purposes.
To take another example, in Heller, Scalia presupposes—with his version
of original public meaning originalism—that the point of adopting the
Second Amendment was to codify a preexisting common law individual
right to bear arms for self-defense as recorded in Blackstone.72 He
presupposes this irrespective of (and in the face of) the language of the
Second Amendment—“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall
not be infringed”73—which suggests that its purpose instead is to preserve
well-regulated state militias. And he presupposes this irrespective of the
69. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary
Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 438 (1986).
70. See, e.g., Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2637 (2013) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he Civil War Amendments used ‘language [that] authorized transformative
new federal statutes to uproot all vestiges of unfreedom and inequality.’” (quoting AKHIL
REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 361, 363, 399 (2005))); Reva B.
Siegel, Equality’s Frontiers: How Congress’s Section 5 Power Can Secure Transformative
Equality (As Justice Ginsburg Illustrates in Coleman), 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 267 (2013).
71. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 743 (1997) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he source of [the] right to refuse treatment was not just a common-law rule.
Rather, this right is an aspect of a far broader and more basic concept of freedom that is even
older than the common law. This freedom embraces not merely a person’s right to refuse a
particular kind of unwanted treatment, but also her interest in dignity, and in determining the
character of the memories that will survive long after her death.”).
72. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 593–97 (2008).
73. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
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arguments in the debates concerning the reasons for adopting the
Amendment, which suggest that its purpose was to protect state militias
from being abolished by the federal government.74 Scalia construes the
purpose of the Amendment in light of his prior jurisprudential
presupposition that constitutional commitments are the deposit of historical
practices.
The “meaning of the operative clause” of the Second
Amendment75—because of his prior jurisprudential presuppositions about
the point of adopting a constitutional amendment protecting rights—just
has to be to codify the common law right to bear arms for self-defense.
Justice Stevens, who takes a purposive approach to constitutional
interpretation in general, and to the Second Amendment in particular,
begins with the preamble to the Amendment—“A well regulated Militia,
being necessary to the security of a free State”—and construes the right to
bear arms in light of that stated purpose.76 He observes that the language of
the Amendment says nothing about a common law individual right to bear
arms for self-defense. He further observes that the arguments in the debates
confirm that the purpose in adopting the Amendment was to protect against
federal abolition of state militias. Furthermore, just as Stevens has rejected
Scalia’s idea that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause is to embody common law practices regarding liberty,77 so too he
rejects the idea that the purpose of the Second Amendment is to codify
common law practices concerning an individual right to bear arms for selfdefense. Instead, for Stevens, we have to ask what purpose is expressed in
the actual language of the Second Amendment, and whether the debates by
the Framers and ratifiers concerning the reasons for adopting the
Amendment confirm that stated purpose.
In common understanding, originalist interpretation is thought to involve
discovering and following the intent of the Framers. Yet Scalia, an avowed
originalist, writes:
Justice Stevens relies on the drafting history of the Second
Amendment—the various proposals in the state conventions and the
debates in Congress. It is dubious to rely on such history to interpret a
text that was widely understood to codify a pre-existing right, rather than
to fashion a new one.78

What is going on here? Many have distinguished between “old
originalism,” which is concerned to discover and follow the intent of the
Framers, and “new originalism,” which is concerned to discover and follow
the original public meaning of the words of the document (irrespective of
what the Framers might have intended). Here, Scalia is claiming to be an
original public meaning originalist, and he is claiming that the original
public meaning of the Second Amendment was to codify a preexisting

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Heller, 554 U.S. at 637 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 592–95 (majority opinion).
Id. at 640–44 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
Heller, 554 U.S. at 603.
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common law right, which he claims was an individual right to bear arms for
self-defense.
Furthermore, in our own time, disagreement about the meaning of our
basic constitutional commitments, including constitutional rights protected
by the Second Amendment, is deep and pervasive. Yet Justice Scalia
writes, “Justice Stevens’ view . . . relies on the proposition, unsupported by
any evidence, that different people of the Founding period had vastly
different conceptions of the right to keep and bear arms. That simply does
not comport with our longstanding view that the Bill of Rights codified
venerable, widely understood liberties.”79 Is this a sound presupposition
about constitutional commitments? If one looks at all of the historical
evidence presented in the three opinions in Heller, isn’t it very much open
to question whether the Second Amendment was “widely understood” to
protect the liberties that Scalia insists upon? Again, Scalia takes this view
because of his prior jurisprudential presupposition that this just has to be
the nature of constitutional commitments, irrespective of the language of
the Constitution and of the evidence of disagreement concerning its
meaning. That is why Scalia rejects, as “dubious,” any arguments from the
debates concerning the reasons for adoption of the Second Amendment—
the arguments that Stevens sees as central to understanding the purpose of
the Amendment.
To suggest just how radically conservative Scalia’s presuppositions about
original public meaning are, I shall formulate two hypotheticals involving
constitutional amendments protecting the right to bear arms, with two sets
of evidence concerning the reasons for adopting the amendment. Each
hypothetical amendment contains the same text: “A well regulated Militia,
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” Is this some kind of joke?
Don’t I know that the Second Amendment already consists of this very
language? I do. As will soon become clear, that’s part of the point of the
exercise.
(1) The first hypothetical goes like this. It is 1791. James Madison
proposes the foregoing language of the amendment. He says:
I know that there is a common law individual right to bear arms for
self-defense as recorded in Blackstone. Forget that common law right.
And forget Blackstone. We’ll leave it to the common law to protect that
right. We must never forget that it is a Constitution we are making and
amending.80 We are making over the world81—embarking upon an
experiment in constitutional self-government by reflection and choice82—
not codifying common law rights or enshrining the deposit of historical
practices. What we are concerned about here is the states’ right to
maintain a well regulated militia, and we are concerned that without this

79. Id. at 604–05.
80. I am alluding, of course, to Chief Justice John Marshall’s famous statement in
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 317, 407 (1819).
81. I am alluding to Brennan, supra note 69, at 438.
82. I mean to evoke a famous line from THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton).
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amendment the federal government might abolish state militias. And so,
to make it as clear as language possibly can, we are going to insert a
preamble at the beginning of the amendment: “A well regulated Militia,
being necessary to the security of a free State.” This language will make
it clear beyond doubt that we are not here talking about any common law
individual right to bear arms for self-defense. No one will ever be able to
gainsay that the amendment is instead concerned with protecting the
states’ right to maintain a well regulated militia.

In this hypothetical, Madison drafts the amendment and is the only one who
speaks about its purpose and meaning at the convention. Immediately after
his speech, which receives a standing ovation, the delegates unanimously
propose the amendment. It is subsequently ratified.
I daresay that, even under this hypothetical, Scalia would interpret the
original public meaning of the amendment as being to codify the common
law individual right to bear arms for self-defense. He would advance this
interpretation, not because of any reason given in support of this
interpretation at the time of the framing and adoption of the amendment.
He would advance it instead because of his prior jurisprudential
presupposition that constitutional rights, as such, must codify known,
preexisting rights, not fashion new ones. Again, with this jurisprudential
preconception, Scalia blunts the transformative purpose of constitution
making and amendment, and renders vain any attempt to “make over the
world” or “fashion new rights” that are not longstanding common law
rights.
(2) Here is the second hypothetical. It is 2018. In the ten years since the
Supreme Court decided Heller, Heller itself—together with a series of
school massacres and assassinations of presidents and members of Congress
who fought for gun control measures—provokes a backlash leading to a
constitutional amendment. The supporters of gun control in the House and
Senate—led by the biggest critics of Heller’s reading of the Second
Amendment as protecting an individual right to bear arms for self-defense
rather than the states’ right to maintain a well regulated militia—as a rebuke
to the Court’s interpretation in Heller, reaffirm the very language of that
Amendment through the constitutional amendment process. During the
process of amendment, they hold elaborate and extensive debates
concerning the reasons for adopting the amendment and reaffirming the
language of the Second Amendment, emphasizing the aim to repeal
Heller’s interpretation of that very language. They engage in extensive
criticism of Scalia’s opinion in Heller and extensive praise of Stevens’s and
Breyer’s dissenting opinions. They also carry out extensive discussion to
establish beyond doubt that the purpose of the preamble is to make it as
clear as words can make it that this amendment is to protect the states’ right
to maintain a militia, not any common law individual right to bear arms for
self-defense.
I daresay that, even under this second hypothetical, Scalia likely would
interpret the original public meaning of the newly adopted amendment as
being to codify the common law individual right to bear arms for self-
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defense. I imagine that he would reject, as “dubious,” any recourse to the
original public meaning as manifested in the debates concerning the
purposes of adopting the language of the Amendment. I would expect him
to stand firm in his contention that the text was “to codify a pre-existing
right, rather than to fashion a new one.”83
My larger point with both of these hypotheticals is that Scalia’s approach
to original public meaning blunts the transformative purpose of constitution
making and amendment—as we have also seen in his approach to
interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses. It does so because of his prior jurisprudential presuppositions
concerning (1) what counts as original public meaning, and (2) what the
purpose of constitution making and amendment is. Scalia’s approach to
original public meaning historicizes rights.
Under his approach,
constitution makers and amenders are not fashioning abstract commitments
to rights whose meaning must be elaborated over time to determine our best
understanding of them in the context of problems as they arise. Instead,
they are codifying preexisting rights whose content is known through their
deposit in historical practices—the common law and statute books at the
time of the ratification of the language.
CONCLUSION
I have suggested that the salutary inclusiveness of the new originalism—
in particular, its emphasis on the distinction between interpretation and
construction—may give away more to the moral reading than the new
originalists have recognized. Accordingly, the prospects for reconciliation
between the new originalism and the moral reading may be better than have
been appreciated. But I also have suggested that the movement from
intention of the Framers to original public meaning may have an
unacknowledged or at any rate underappreciated conservative bent. I have
issued a cautionary tale about how resort to original public meaning has
entered into judicial decisionmaking by Justice Scalia, blunting the very
possibility of constitutional transformation through amendment, and,
indeed, of constitutional self-government through reflection and choice.

83. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.

